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Abstract
The rapid rise of Chinese companies in the global economy has attracted great scholarly
attention to Chinese corporate governance. Among the various areas of Chinese corporate
governance, executive compensation is an important yet difficult part to research. The common
research method of Chinese executive pay literature relies on pay figures disclosed in listed
companies’ annual reports and tends to take the disclosed numbers at face value. This Article
discusses three informal pay practices that constrain the usefulness and reliability of executive
pay data formally disclosed in annual reports of Chinese listed companies, especially those
owned by the state. A valid reading of formal pay figures entails an understanding of the network
structure and the political environment in which Chinese companies operate. An investigation of
the practices behind formal compensation numbers sheds light on many issues for scholars and
policymakers, the salience of which escalates as the international interaction with Chinese
companies expands. For example, it stresses the important role of political institutions in shaping
executive compensation; it raises questions about the extent to which international cross-listing
improves transparency of Chinese companies; it critically evaluates whether China’s latest
reform policy deals with the real problems of its state-owned enterprises; it spotlights the lacuna
of extant scholarship on Chinese executive compensation.
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Introduction
China now ranks second behind the United States in number of the world’s largest 2,000
public corporations on the Forbes list.1 The rapid rise of Chinese companies in the global
economy has drawn great scholarly attention to Chinese corporate governance. Scholars of
comparative corporate governance however often observe significant limits of using standard
theories or Western experience to understand Chinese companies. Among the various areas of
Chinese corporate governance, executive compensation is an important yet difficult part to
research. As the Economist aptly noted years ago, “How executives are rewarded is one of the
many mysteries of China's increasingly powerful companies. Unravelling it is important, not
least because it should help to explain corporate China's transformation from a state-controlled to
a consumer-driven creature.”2
In the past decade a growing body of literature has tried to bring Chinese executive pay
practices to light. Most studies of Chinese executive pay follow the conventional approach of
Western compensation literature: taking the publicly-listed firm as the unit of observation,
focusing on the listed firm’s pay figures disclosed in the annual report, and regressing the
dependent variable of the disclosed pay amount on a set of independent variables such as
revenues, profits, ownership type, etc.3 This typical approach produces useful insights, to be sure,
yet it is an under-contextualized approach to studying Chinese companies, particularly the statecontrolled firms. It overlooks the fact that a Chinese listed firm often is a member of a corporate
group in which there are frequent intra-group transactions and personnel overlaps among
1

The Forbes Global 2000 is an annual ranking of the world’s top 2,000 public companies by Forbes
Magazine. The ranking is based on a combination of four metrics: sales, profit, assets and market value. In 2016, the
U.S. leads the list with 579 companies, followed by China (mainland and Hong Kong) with 232. Chinese companies
own the top four spots and split the top ten spots with U.S companies. For the full list, see
http://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/#tab:overall.
2
Executive Compensation in China: False Options, THE ECONOMIST, September 4, 2008
http://www.economist.com/node/12070705.
3
See Section II for the review of this empirical literature.
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member companies. The incentive systems of group-affiliated firms may be different from those
of typical stand-alone firms considered in the Western executive pay literature.4 Moreover, this
common approach relying on corporate annual reports assumes that China has effective
enforcement of securities regulations and Chinese companies have a culture of compliance and
truthful disclosure. This assumption should be accepted with caution. Chinese public companies
and even the government itself have a notorious reputation of data manipulation.5 Big accounting
firms in China have been embroiled in the scandals of accounting frauds.6 As Professor Donald
Clarke notes, “the reality of corporate governance practices in China remains very different from
what appears in the statute books, and indeed so opaque that it is difficult to measure reliably
where it is, let alone in what direction it is moving.”7 It suggests nontrivial limits of using the
standard methodology to capture the true picture of executive compensation in China.
This Article focuses on three common practices that constrain the usefulness and
reliability of executive pay data disclosed in Chinese listed companies’ annual reports: on-duty
consumption, zero compensation, and nominal versus actual pay. In particular, this Article
collects data to show the striking yet overlooked zero-pay puzzle presented in Chinse listed
companies’ annual reports, where a considerably large proportion of board members of Chinese
4

For literature on Chinese corporate groups showing how group affiliation affects affiliated firm’s financial
performance and behavior, see Lisa Keister, CHINESE BUSINESS GROUPS: THE STRUCTURE AND IMPACT
OF INTERFIRM RELATIONS DURING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2000); Michael Carney et al., Business
Group Performance in China: Ownership and Temporal Considerations, 5 MGMT.& ORG. REV. 167 (2009).
5
Nina Xiang, Accounting Fraud Is Still Widespread Among Chinese Companies, FORBES, April 16, 2014,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ninaxiang/2014/04/16/accounting-fraud-is-still-widespread-among-chinesecompanies/#2eb89f88723e. After China Fraud Boom, Nasdaq Steps Up Scrutiny Of Shady Listings, MARKET
WATCH, June 20, 2016 (reporting that “more than 50 U.S. listed Chinese companies were either delisted or halted
from trading in 2011 and 2012 based on claims of fraud and other violations of U.S. securities laws”). Whether to
Believe China’s GDP Figures, THE ECONIMIST, July 15, 2015,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/07/chinese-economy; Johnathan Chew, China Officials Admit
They Fake Economic Figures, FORTUNE Dec. 14, 2015, http://fortune.com/2015/12/14/china-fake-economic-data/.
6
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), SEC Imposes Sanctions Against China-Based Members of
Big Four Accounting Networks for Refusing to Produce Documents, press release of Feb. 6, 2015,
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-25.html.
7
Donald Clarke, “Nothing but WIND”?: The Past and Future of Comparative Corporate Governance, 59
AM. J. COMP. L. 75, 101-02 (2010).
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listed firms are reported to earn no compensation paid by the listed companies that they serve. To
the best of author’s knowledge, this is the first systematic analysis of the zero-pay puzzle in
extant scholarship. These three compensation practices lurking behind the formal numbers must
be understood against a backdrop of regulatory slacks and corporate group structures being used
to support the interests of the Chinese state-owner. China’s current securities regulations give
listed companies freedom to mystify their top management compensation practices through the
pervasive personnel linkages in a corporate group; and the mystification particularly serves the
interests of the state-owner, who have been unwilling to relinquish control over the personnel of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
These three compensation practices raise concerns about data comparability and
reliability of Chinese listed companies’ annual reports. As shown in this Article, the data
problems are not alleviated by cross-listing in better disclosure regimes such as the stock
exchanges of the United States and Hong Kong. These informal pay practices also raise
questions about whether executives of China’s listed firms are capable to discharge their
fiduciary duties to the listed firms they serve.
Furthermore, observing the pay practices behind the formal numbers published in
corporate annual reports offers a nuanced view on the perennial scholarly debate about the
trajectory of national corporate governance systems in the age of globalization. It suggests that
politics play an important role in the formal rules and actual practices of executive compensation.
It also offers an insightful perspective to evaluate China’s recent SOE reform agenda.
In China, the term “executives” or “top managers” (gaoguan) usually includes directors,
supervisors, the general manager (CEO), deputy general managers (vice CEOs), the financial
officer, the corporate secretary and others described in the articles of incorporation. This
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common usage considers the fact that directors and supervisors are usually corporate senior
managers.8 To be consistent with China’s common usage, “executive compensation” referred in
this Article includes compensation for directors, supervisors, and other top managers.
This Article is organized as follows. Section I will set out the existing regulatory
framework of executive compensation China. It helps explain how the formal regulatory rules
make the mystification of executive pay possible. Section II will review existing scholarly
studies of Chinese executive compensation to show what sorts of pay information are typically
examined in existing literature. Section III will discuss three informal pay practices that render
compensation information disclosed in the corporate annual report significantly incomplete or
misleading. Finally, Section IV discusses theoretical and policy implications as well as questions
for future research.

I.

The Formal Rules of Executive Compensation
Executive compensation in China is regulated by four legal sources: the company law,

securities regulations for listed companies, special rules for financial institutions and rules for
state-controlled firms. An overview of the legal sources provides a backdrop to understand how
actual compensation practices deviate from the formal rules and how the formal rules play a role
in concealing actual practices.
A. The Company Law
China’s 2006 Company Law is the fundamental legal source of Chinese corporate
governance. A major governance feature under China’s corporate law is the dual board structure,
which consists of the board of directors and the board of supervisors. Figure 1 below shows the

8

Lin Lin, Regulating Executive Compensation in China: Problems and Solutions, 32 J. L. & COMM. 207,
212 (adopting the same definition of “executives” in the Chinese context).
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governance structure under China’s corporate law. The function of the board of directors is
similar to the board in the Anglo-American corporate system. The board of directors is
responsible for managing the corporation’s business and affairs, including the appointment of
senior officers and the determination of their compensation. The board of supervisors is
responsible for supervising directors and senior officers in performing their duties. Both boards
are elected by shareholders, who are entitled to receive periodic disclosure of executive
compensation paid by the company and have the authority to approve the compensation of
directors and supervisors at the general shareholder meeting.9
Figure 1. Governance Structure under China’s Company Law

B. Securities Regulations for Listed Companies
The China Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is the main government
agency overseeing listed companies in China. CSRC’s Code of Corporate Governance for Listed
Companies (2002) suggests that a listed company may establish the compensation committee to
study and review the company’s remuneration policies for directors and senior officers.10 It also
suggests that the board of directors should disclose compensation information to shareholders.
9

The Company Act of China (2006), §§ 38 & 47.
The Company Act of China (2006), §§ 52 & 56; Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in
China, (Zhengjianfa No.1 of 2002), available at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69223.html.
10
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While in the early 1990s China’s securities regulations already required listed companies to
disclose executive compensation in their annual reports, most listed companies in fact did not
comply with the rules.11 In 1999, CSRC promulgated a new rule which required the listed
company to disclose in its annual report the lump sum of compensation paid to its directors,
supervisors and senior officers; and the company was required to list all the directors,
supervisors and senior officers who did not receive compensation from the company.12 While
this disclosure rule had no compliance problems, the lump sum approach provided very limited
information to understand each individual executive’s compensation.
The compensation disclosure rules were amended in 2001.13 The 2001 amendment
required disclosure of executive pay policies. Moreover, instead of lumping directors’,
supervisors’ and senior officers’ compensation all altogether, the rules required the listed
company to disclose the sum of the top three paid directors and the sum of the top three paid
officers respectively. Independent directors’ compensation should be disclosed on an individual
basis. The listed company was required to list executives who did not receive any compensation
from the company and indicated whether or not they received any pay from its shareholders or
subsidiaries. This disclosure rule implied that top managers were allowed to be paid by the listed
company’s shareholders or affiliates rather than by the listed company itself. Yet how much
compensation paid by the listed company’s affiliates was not subject to disclosure.

11

Gupiao Faxing yu Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Administrative Regulations on Stock
Issuance and Trading] (1993), §59.
12
Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Xinxi Pilu de Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze Dierhao <Niandu Baogao de
Neirong yu Geshi> [Public Companies’ Disclosure Content and Format Rules No. 2 <Content and Format of Annual
Reports> ] (1999).
13
Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Xinxi Pilu de Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze Dierhao <Niandu Baogao de
Neirong yu Geshi> [Public Companies’ Disclosure Content and Format Rules No. 2 <Content and Format of Annual
Reports> ] (2001) § 26.
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In 2005, CSRC amended the disclosure rules resulting in mandatory disclosure of each
executive’s compensation.14 The disclosure scheme included two parts: the total compensation
and the current equity holdings. The total compensation is the sum of base salary, bonuses,
subsidies, employee benefits, insurance and other forms of compensation paid by the company.
The rules maintained the position that the listed company should list executives who did not
receive any pay from the company and should indicate whether or not they received
compensation from the company’s shareholders or subsidiaries. Still, how much compensation
paid by the company’s affiliates remained undisclosed. The most current disclosure rules
(released in 2016) are virtually the same as the rules of 2005.15
C. Rules for Financial Institutions
In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the Chinese government tightened its
control over executive compensation of the financial sector, which has been dominated by SOEs.
In 2009, the Ministry of Finance placed an annual pay cap at RMB 2.8 million (approximately
$410 thousand in USD) 16 for executives at state-controlled financial institutions; moreover, it
promulgated rules to strengthen the link between pay and performance. The China Banking
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) also published guidelines to regulate executive pay practices of
China’s financial institutions (including policy banks, commercial banks, financial assets
management companies, financial cooperatives, and finance companies, etc.), whether state-

14

Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Xinxi Pilu de Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze Dierhao <Niandu Baogao de
Neirong yu Geshi> [Public Companies’ Disclosure Content and Format Rules No. 2 <Content and Format of Annual
Reports> ] (2005) § 26.
15
Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Xinxi Pilu de Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze Dierhao <Niandu Baogao de
Neirong yu Geshi> [Public Companies’ Disclosure Content and Format Rules No. 2 <Content and Format of Annual
Reports> ] (2016) §53, available at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgf/xxpl/xxplnr/201701/P020170111425807651253.pdf.
16
The official historical average exchange rate of USD to Renminbi for the year of 2009 is 1:6.831.
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owned or not.17 According to the guidelines, the structure of executive compensation should
include fixed salary, variable pay (i.e., performance-oriented compensation and short-term and
long-term incentives) and benefits (e.g. housing subsidies). The guidelines set out details of
executive compensation management. For instance, the base salary should be no more than 35%
of the total compensation and 40% of performance bonus should be paid on a deferral basis with
the deferral period not less than three years. Financial institutions that fail to comply with the
guidelines would be subject to sanctions imposed by CBRC.
D. Rules for Non-Financial SOEs
At present, China’s largest non-financial SOEs are controlled by the central or local
government’s ownership agency, known as the State-Owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission (SASAC). The large non-financial SOEs under SASAC’s control
are typically organized as vertically-integrated business groups. Figure 2 illustrates the
organizational structure of a typical business group under SASAC’s control.18 The parent
company typically is 100 per cent owned by SASAC. Beneath the parent company are a large
number of subsidiaries including listed firms, finance companies, research institutes and many
other related firms along the production chain. Often there are frequent business transactions and
personnel overlaps among member firms in a group.

17

Shangye Yinhang Wenjian Xinchou Jianguan Zhiyin [Supervision Guidelines on Healthy Compensation
of Commercial Banks], CBRC〔2010〕No. 14 (Feb. 21, 2010).
18
For a detailed discussion on the organization and governance of the business groups under SASAC’s
control, see Li-Wen Lin and Curtis J. Milhaupt, We are the (National Champions): Understanding the Mechanisms
of State Capitalism in China, 65 STANFORD L. REV. 697 (2013).
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Figure 2. Typical Structure of a Non-Financial State-Owned Group

SASAC is authorized by the State-Owned Enterprise Assets Act (a special law outside
the company law) to determine managerial compensation of the company under its direct control,
i.e. the parent company in Figure 2.19 Since its establishment in 2003, SASAC in cooperation
with relevant government and party organs has introduced a series of measures to reform the
parent company’s executive compensation.20 Some important measures include: managerial
compensation structure consist of base salary, bonus, and mid-term and long-term incentives
which are linked with corporate performance; executive pay pegged to the average worker’s pay
at certain fixed rate;21 using sophisticated formula to determine the pay level based on a set of
economic, social, environmental and political indicators.22
19

Qiye Guoyou Zichan Fa [State-Owned Enterprise Assets Act] (2008), Chapter 4.
The regulations usually were promulgated jointly with the Organization Department of the Chinese
Communist Party (i.e., the Party’s human resources department), the Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security, the Ministry of Finance, National Audit Office, the Ministry of Inspection and SASAC.
21
According to SASAC’s 2009 guidelines, base salaries should not be more than 5 times of SOEs’ average
worker’s pay in prior year and performance bonuses should not be more than 3 times of base salaries; in other words,
the total compensation including base salaries and performance bonuses should be no more than 20 times of SOEs’
average worker’s pay. The original text of the guidelines (Guanyu Jinyibu Guifan Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren
Xinchou Guanli de Zhidao Yijian [Guidelines Concerning Further Regulating Executive Compensation of the
Central State-Owned Enterprises]) was never unpublished to the public; but a summary and inside information is
available in People’s Daily, an official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party. See Pay for Senior SOE
20
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Recently, the government’s anti-corruption campaign has escalated the SOE pay reform.
In 2014, the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee, presided by
President Xi Jinping, passed a set of rules to reform SOE executive pay.23 Top managers
(including directors, supervisors, CEOs and vice CEOs) of the SOEs directly owned by SASAC
(i.e. the parent company in Figure 2) are subject to the new rules.24 The government’s reform
statement reaffirms the use of performance-oriented pay and prohibits illegal financial income.25
E. Evaluation
The brief overview of China’s executive compensation rules shows that government
intervention is quite direct and pervasive. Mandatory disclosure, a common form of government
intervention in executive compensation, indeed exists in China. But the depth of information
disclosure is relatively limited compared to the disclosure standards in advanced capital markets
such as the United States. Disclosure of each executive’s compensation was not required until
2005. Still, the scope of executive compensation remains vague and it does not require disclosure
of a breakdown of compensation composition. It raises questions about comparability of
compensation data across companies in China.

Executives Capped at 20 Times Average Employee Pay, People’s Daily, September 25, 2009, at
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/10113071.html.
22
SASAC, Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Jingying Yeji Kaohe Zanxing Banfa [Provisional Measures on the
Comprehensive Evaluation of Top Managers of the Central State-Owned Enterprises], Decebmer 29, 2012, available
at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1566/n257060/n257203/15124088.html.
23
Zhongyang Guanli Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Zhidu Gaige Fangan [Reform Scheme on Executive
Compensation of the Central State-Owned Enterprises]; Guanyu Heli Queding bing Yange Guifan Zhongyang Qiye
Fuzeren Luzhi Daiyu , Yewu Zhichu de Yijian [Opinions on Rationalizing and Strictly Regulating Position-Related
Treatments and Business-Related Expenses of Top Managers of the Central State-Owned Enterprises], passed by the
Central Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China on August 29, 2014. A summary of the rules is available
on the website of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of China,
http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/dongtaixinwen/buneiyaowen/201409/t20140903_139627.htm.
24
While the rules are applicable to the SOEs under SASAC’s control, the government explicitly
encouraged all central and local SOEs adopt similar rules. As a result, many local governments recently have taken
similar steps to curb executive pay at their SOEs.
25
While a brief summary of the pay reform policy has been released by the government, until today the full
text of the rules remains unpublished to the public.
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Another problem involves the permissibility that executives may receive no
compensation from the listed company but from its shareholders or subsidiaries. The regulations
only require the listed company to disclose “whether or not” executives receive pay from its
affiliates. The amount of compensation actually paid by the listed company’s affiliates is not
subject to disclosure. Section III will empirically show that the business group structure coupled
with this regulatory slack lead to the zero-pay phenomenon, significantly masking the actual
compensation practices in China.
The most silent government intervention is that the state itself directly determines the pay
level in SOEs. As discussed above, the government has imposed a maximum amount of
executive compensation on SOEs. Moreover, by virtue of the State-Owned Enterprise Assets Act,
the state-owner authorizes itself the power to determine not only directors’ compensation but
also compensation of senior officers such as CEOs and vice CEOs. In other words, the stateowner has a super control right that is unavailable under the corporate law where shareholders
have authority to determine director remuneration yet the board of directors approves
compensation for senior officers.
In fact, the state-owner not only legitimates its intervention through the special law, its
involvement is more penetrating than what the law appears to be. As Section III will show,
SASAC’s compensation power effectively reaches down to the listed subsidiaries, rather than
restricted to the parent company as proclaimed in the law. By leveraging the complex corporate
group structure and complementary disclosure rules, the state-owner effectively conceals actual
SOE compensation practices notwithstanding mandatory disclosure of each executive’s
compensation paid by the listed firm.
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II.

The Numbers Scrutinized in the Spotlight
Empirical analysis is essential in understanding executive compensation. Without

compensation data, it is impossible to systematically observe the pay level, composition and the
relationship between pay and performance. Using empirical methods to analyze executive
remuneration data is the main approach both in Western and Chinese executive pay literature. As
discussed in Section I, starting in 1999, China’s listed companies began to disclose the sum of
top three paid directors and the sum of top three paid senior officers; and starting in 2005, they
should disclose in the annual report the compensation of each director, supervisor and senior
officer. These disclosure rules triggered the takeoff of Chinese executive pay research.
Existing Chinese executive pay literature, both in Chinese and English, typically
concerns two related empirical questions: whether there is a positive relationship between pay
and firm performance; and if yes, what the determinants of pay-performance sensitivity are. The
extant studies tend to find a positive relationship between executive pay and performance, while
significance and magnitude of the positive linkage vary with performance measures and sample
periods. Often studies investigate how corporate governance attributes such as ownership
concentration, ownership identity (e.g., state-owned or not), and board structure (e.g. board size,
number of independent directors) affect pay-performance sensitivity, and the results seem
inconclusive.
Regardless of their research questions, all the studies need to measure executive
compensation. Because of general quality concerns about Chinese academic journals, this
Article will focus on the studies published in English scholarly journals. A summary of pay
variables and data periods in major English studies of Chinese executive compensation is
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provided in Appendix. The summary is not intended to serve as a comprehensive literature
review but to show existing studies’ common approaches to measuring executive compensation.
As shown in Appendix, early studies relied on survey data to examine Chinese SOEs’
executive compensation practices in the 1980s. The sample companies in these early studies
were non-listed companies because China’s stock exchanges had not been established until the
early 1990s. All the other studies focus on listed firms, and their study periods start from 1999
or thereafter due to data availability made by mandatory compensation disclosure rules. Most of
the existing studies focus on cash compensation (i.e. salary and bonus) rather than equity as
Chinese listed firms rarely use equity incentives. The pay variable of studies covering the years
prior to 2005 is typically measured as the sum or the average of the three highest-paid senior
officers or directors; the pay variable of studies that focus on 2005 or after use individual
executive pay. This measurement pattern reflects data availability under the disclosure rules.
Clearly, most studies focus on cash compensation while only few studies examine
perquisites. Perquisites typically include housing subsidies, travel reimbursement, entertainment
expenses, etc. The limited investigation of perquisites is due to the fact that Chinese listed
companies are not required to disclose such information.
No matter how scholars measure executive compensation (cash, equity or perks), they
typically take the listed firm as a stand-alone unit of analysis. Executive compensation is
analyzed as an outcome of the listed firm’s internal governance such as the percentage of
independent directors on the board, chairman-CEO duality, the existence of compensation
committee, or shareholder identity (e.g. state or non-state).
Overall, extent empirical studies focus on cash compensation disclosed in the corporate
annual report. While this approach produces insights, there remain great limitations of
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understanding actual managerial compensation practices of Chinese listed companies. As Section
III will show, there are simultaneously under-, over- and non-reporting problems in Chinese
listed firms’ executive compensation disclosure. The numbers disclosed in the corporate annual
report should be taken cautiously rather at their face value.

III.

The Practices Hidden in the Shadow
This section analyzes three disclosure practices peculiar to China’s ownership structure

and compensation regulations that mask actual executive pay of Chinese listed companies,
particularly state-controlled firms. The first practice is the non-disclosure of perks or so-called
“on-duty consumption.” Because some existing studies have recognized on-duty consumption, it
will simply give a brief discussion of its institutional causes. Attention will be focused on the
other two practices that are overlooked in the extant literature. The second practice is the zerocompensation phenomenon where a large number of directors and supervisors do not receive any
compensation from the listed company they serve. The third practice concerns the gap between
actual and nominal pay.
A. On-Duty Consumption
On-duty consumption (zaizhi xiaofei) is an important source of income for Chinese SOE
executives. It involves various benefits enjoyed as a result of one's position. Typical benefits
include housing allowance, personal use of corporate cars, shopping vouchers, travel expenses,
and entertainment expenditures. The true amount of perk consumption is difficult to estimate
because China’s listed companies are not required to disclose such information. Even if disclosed
at all, perk consumption is likely underreported or significantly obscured. A conservative
estimate suggested that perks could range between 15 and 32 percent of the total executive

15

Behind the Numbers
L.Lin

compensation in China.26 Another study suggested that the average managerial perks could be as
high as eight times of the average cash pay.27
Despite the significance of perks in Chinese executive compensation, very few studies
focus on perks because of data unavailability. Chinese listed companies are not required to
disclose information on executive perks. Less than 50 percent of the listed firms voluntarily
disclosed such expenses; and even if they did, the disclosed information was in a lump-sum
format where shareholders could not distinguish legitimate corporate operating expenses from
managerial personal benefits.28 Therefore, most scholars focus on the observable data (i.e. salary
and bonus) rather than the unobservable (i.e. perks).
The use of on-duty compensation in SOEs traces back to the traditional compensation
system. Before the economic reform starting in the 1980s, all enterprises were state-owned and
managers’ compensation was subject to the civil service pay system. The system was based on
egalitarianism in which there were little salary differentials between ordinary workers and highrank employees.29 Yet government employees above a certain rank could receive considerable
rank-specific perks. While in 1985 the SOE pay system separated from the government pay
system, no-duty consumption remains as a significant hidden pay component for SOE executives.
Because on-duty consumption is off-sheet income and subject to little monitoring, it has been
criticized as a major source of corruption in the SOE system. The Chinese government very
recently in the anti-corruption campaign made high-profile regulations to restrain the abuse of
26

Takao Kato and Cheryl Long, Executive Compensation, Firm Performance and Corporate Governance
in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, 54 Economic Development
and Cultural Change 945, 961 (2006).
27
Donghua Chen et al. Do Managers Perform for Perks?, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562003 (March 1,
2010).
28
Martin J. Conyon et al., Organizational Slack, CEO Turnover and the Horizon Problem in China,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2355744 (March 10 2016) at p.20, fn 3 (arguing the limits of
using voluntarily disclosed perk-related expenditures to estimate the true amount of perks).
29
For detailed discussion on China’s civil pay system, see Hon S. Chan, How Are They Paid? A Study Of
Civil Service Pay In China, 77 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 294 (2011).
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on-duty consumption in the SOEs. The regulatory rules limit the scope of on-duty consumption
to certain qualified expenditures. 30 The effects of the recent rules are in question given that
similar regulatory rules have already been in place for a decade.31
Critically speaking, the government’s existing reform on on-duty consumption has only
scratched the surface of the problem. The fundamental problem of on-duty consumption lies not
in extravagant expenditures, but in the government’s (precisely the Chinese Communist Party’s)
unwillingness to let go its control over SOE personnel. My previous work has shown that the
Chinese government frequently rotates people between government bureaus and SOEs as an
important way to control the management of SOEs.32 The common personnel linkages inevitably
make government officials a group of peers for SOE executives. As a result, a SOE executive’s
pay is implicitly benchmarked against the pay of a government official of equivalent rank, whose
pay structure has a very low salary but considerable perks.33 As mentioned above, the amount of
on-duty consumption is rank-specific, depending on one’s administrative rank (xinzheng jibei) in
the government system. For example, ministers enjoy the perks of the ministerial level. Since
1999 the Chinese government has made several regulatory attempts to abandon administrative
rank for SOEs, but the rules have been effectively disregarded.34 The largest five state-owned

30

Guanyu Heli Queding bing Yange Guifan Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Luzhi Daiyu , Yewu Zhichu de
Yijian [Opinions on Rationalizing and Strictly Regulating Position-Related Treatments and Business-Related
Expenses of Top Managers of the Central State-Owned Enterprises], passed by the Central Political Bureau of the
Communist Party of China on August 29, 2014. In the Opinions, position-related treatments include the use of
corporate vehicles, corporate housing, and training (including training at the Chinese Communist Party School and
administrative academy but explicitly excluding MBA or EMBA tuitions). Business-related expenses include
expenses for customer entertainment, travel, and telecommunication.
31
SASAC, Guanyu Guifan Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Zhiwu Xiaofei de Zhidao Yijian[Guidelines on OnDuty Consumption of Top Managers of the Central State-Owned Enterprises](2006).
32
Li-Wen Lin, State Ownership and Corporate Governance in China: An Executive Career Approach,
2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 743 (2013) (investigating the CEO career paths of Chinese SOEs and finding that
generally more than 20% of the CEOs spent some time in government bureaus before their CEO appointments).
33
Chan, supra note 29.
34
The 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party passed a resolution (Guanyu Guoyou Qiye
Gaige he Fazhan Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding [Resolution on Several Important Questions Concerning SOE
Reform and Development]) to abandon administrative ranks for enterprises and their top managers. In 2000, the
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banks and the largest three state-owned oil companies, for example, hold vice-ministerial rank in
the government system. The use of administrative rank in SOEs allows a unified career platform
for government officials and SOE managers. It efficiently interprets the meaning of a transfer
(promotion, lateral move or demotion) and associated benefits for a rotation between SOEs and
other government units. While the legal pay of an SOE executive is higher than that of an
equivalent-rank official, it is significantly lower than that of executives of privately-owned or
foreign enterprises, another peer group for compensation determination. This sharp pay gap
instigates a feeling of unfairness and adds fire to SOE executives’ unscrupulous extraction from
covert on-duty consumption. (As opposed to the clandestine nature of on-duty consumption,
salary offers relatively limited room to maneuver because salary is formally budgeted and for
public companies it is disclosed to the public). Any pay reform short of actual delinking of the
SOE personnel from the civil service system is ineffective to cure the endemic problem of onduty consumption in China’s SOEs.

B. The Zero-Pay Puzzle
In China, like the United States, the public discourse on executive compensation is
focused on excessive pay. While Chinese executives are paid only a fraction of compensation
State Council also issued a notice to abandon administrative ranks for SOEs. However, the government decisions
were not actually implemented. This was also true for listed SOEs. In 2006, the Shanghai Stock Exchange
conducted a survey of the SOEs listed on the stock exchange to investigate whether the executives retained any
administrative rank. The result showed that about 60% of executives of the listed central SOEs retained
administrative rank. See Shanghai Stock Exchange Research Center, China Corporate Governance Report (2006):
The Corporate Governance of State Holding Listed Companies. Very recent news reports also suggest that
administrative rank remains a living institution in SOEs. See Huihau Nie, Zhongguo Guanyuan Jibie de Zhengzhi
Luoji [The Political Logic of Chinese Government Officials’ Administrative Rank], FINANCIAL TIMES (Chinese),
September 8, 2015, http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001063796?full=y; Xingjie Chen, Feichu Guoqi Lingdao
Xingzheng Jibie? Dou Ni Wan er [Abandoning Administrative Rank in SOEs? Just Kidding You], Sohu Finance,
News New Perspectives Vol. 785, Oct. 10, 28, 2013, http://business.sohu.com/s2013/others786/; Henshue Suo,
Guozi Gaoguan Diaoyan: Chao 99% Buyuan Fangqi Xingzheng Jibie Huan Gaoxin [A Survey on SOE Executives
Shows 99% Unwilling to Give Up Administrative Rank for Higher Compensation], China Business Journal, Issue
2075, September 1, 2014, http://news.cb.com.cn/html/economy_9_19746_1.html (reporting a survey result by the
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of China).
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earned by their Western counterparts,35 the public outcry over high executive pay is by no means
less furious in China. As discussed in Section I, the Chinese government recently has taken
measures to slash executive compensation in SOEs. High executive compensation is ill-tolerated
in China not simply because of the weak connection between pay and performance, but more
importantly, the worsening of social inequality and corruption. A handsome pay becomes
something not for an executive to be proud of, but to be questioned. High-paid executives now
may even stand in the spotlight of shame.
In contrast to eye-catching high compensation, pay as low as zero has been largely
unnoticed in extent literature. A perusal of the compensation data in the corporate annual reports
reveals that a significant number of top managers particularly directors and supervisors report
their compensation as zero. These zero-pay executives do not receive any compensation in cash
or equity from the listed company that they serve. This section first presents the data on the scale
of the zero-pay phenomenon and then it explains the underlying causes and implications.
i.

The Scale of the Zero-Pay Phenomenon

This Article collects executive compensation data and relevant information from the 2014
annual reports of the companies listed on China’s two stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.36 The dataset includes 2,621 listed companies.
Table 1 shows compensation and shareholding data by ownership type and management position.
35

In 2014, the average CEO pay of the listed firms in China was 2.03 million RMB (approximately 326
thousand USD) according to Forbes (China Edition). See Top 10 Mainland Ceos With Best Pay, CHINA DAILY,
July 28, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2015-07/28/content_21424926.htm. The average CEO pay of
S&P 500 firms in the United States was $13.5 million. See AFL-CIO, Executive Pay Watch,
http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/Paywatch-2015.
36
The raw data were mainly collected from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ), a commercial database that
contains comprehensive information about ownership and executive compensation of China’s listed companies.
Moreover, this Article directly extracted information from corporate annual reports to confirm data accuracy. In
China, there are many free online financial databases that provide comprehensive information of Chinese listed
companies. The Article downloaded annual reports from Sina.com and Stockstar.com. The data were compiled and
analyzed with the assistance of computer programs. The listed companies published their 2014 annual reports
sometime in 2015. This Article completed the data collection in January 2016.
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The zero-pay phenomenon exists mainly for directors and supervisors, rather than CEOs. Still
note that six percent of the CEOs of the SOEs controlled by the central government do not earn
any compensation paid by the listed companies they serve. In contrast to CEOs, zero-pay
directors and supervisors are strikingly prevalent. Table 1 shows that 65.3% (61.2%+4.1%) of
the central SOE chairmen, 40.6% (36.2%+4.4%) of the local SOE chairmen, and 12.1%
(8.8%+3.3%) of the non-SOE chairmen are unpaid by the listed companies they serve.
[Table 1] Compensation and Shareholding by Ownership Type and Management Position
Central SOEs

Local SOEs

Non-SOEs

Pay + Shareholding
Pay + No Shareholding
No Pay + Shareholding
No Pay + No Shareholding
Total

84 (25.3%)
228 (68.7%)
0 (0%)
20 (6.0%)
332(100%)

148 (24.1%)
443 (72.1%)
2 (0.3%)
21 (3.4%)
606(100%)

872 (57.1%)
615 (40.3%)
3 (0.2%)
35 (2.3%)
1525(100%)

Pay + Shareholding
Pay + No Shareholding
No Pay + Shareholding
No Pay + No Shareholding
Total

28 (8.2%)
90 (26.5%)
14 (4.1%)
208 (61.2%)
340 (100%)

123 (18.9%)
264 (40.5%)
29 (4.4%)
236 (36.2%)
652 (100%)

953(59.9%)
444 (27.9%)
53 (3.3%)
140 (8.8%)
1590 (100%)

Independent Directors
Pay + Shareholding
Pay + No Shareholding
No Pay + Shareholding
No Pay + No Shareholding
Total

4 (0.3%)
1032 (87.5%)
0 (0%)
144 (12.2%)
1180 (100%)

7 (0.3%)
1963 (88.5%)
2 (.01%)
246 (11.1%)
2218 (100%)

14 (0.3%)
4430 (90.1%)
1 (.02%)
441 (9.0%)
4886 (100%)

Other Directors (Excluding Chairmen and
Independent Directors)
Pay + Shareholding
Pay + No Shareholding
No Pay + Shareholding
No Pay + No Shareholding
Total

169 (9.8%)
573 (33.3%)
55 (3.2%)
922 (53.6%)
1719 (100%)

373 (11.4%)
1485 (43.6%)
87 (2.7%)
1325 (40.6%)
3260(100%)

2626 (39.3%)
2522 (37.7%)
274 (4.1%)
1268 (19.0%)
6690 (100%)

Supervisors
Pay + Shareholding
Pay + No Shareholding
No Pay + Shareholding
No Pay + No Shareholding
Total

100 (6.8%)
721 (48.9%)
24(1.6%)
629 (42.7%)
1474 (100%)

230 (8.2%)
1513 (54.2%)
62(2.2%)
988(35.7%)
2793 (100%)

940 (18.1%)
3299 (63.6%)
93(1.8%)
854(16.5%)
5186 (100%)

CEOs

Chairmen
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The zero-pay phenomenon is much less applicable to independent directors. Among the
independent directors of the central SOEs, only 12.2% of them receive no compensation. A
slightly lower percentage is shown among the local SOE chairmen (11.2%) and among the nonSOE chairmen (9.2%). The compensation of independent directors has been fairly standardized
in which independent directors typically receive a fixed amount of cash payment, with an
average (excluding zero-pay independent directors) of about $72,000 RMB a year.37 The zeropay phenomenon is not a result of independent directors as unpaid volunteers.
For other directors (i.e. directors excluding chairmen and independent directors), the
zero-pay phenomenon is evident in the data. More than 56% of such directors in the central
SOEs, 43% in the local SOEs, and 23% in the non-SOEs receive no compensation. Similar to
directors, 44.3% of the central SOE supervisors, 37.9% of the local SOE supervisors, and 18.3%
of the non-SOE supervisors earn no compensation.
Overall, Table 1 shows that a significant percentage of directors and supervisors of the
listed SOEs particularly those controlled by the central government, report zero in compensation.
Moreover, most of the zero-pay managers (including directors, supervisors and CEOs) do not
have any shareholding, which suggests that the zero-pay phenomenon is not a result of
shareholdings as a substitute for compensation.
Table 2 further shows the distribution of zero-pay boards of directors by ownership type.
A significant portion of listed companies, particularly those controlled by the central government,
demonstrate the board composed of a majority of zero-pay directors. For example, among the
343 central SOEs, 60 companies (17%) have a board in which between 51 and 60 per cent of the
directors on the board do not earn any remuneration (no pay and no shareholding) in the listed
company. Table 2 shows that approximately 27% of the listed companies controlled by the
37

The average amount is calculated on 7,488 paid independent directors in the author’s dataset.
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central government have a board dominated a majority of zero-pay directors;38 15% for local
SOEs and only 3% for non-SOEs.
[Table 2] Structure of the Board of Directors, by Ownership Type
Central SOE
Boards

Local SOE
Boards

Non-SOE
Boards

Percentage of No-Pay Directors on the Board
0-10%
11-20%
21-30%
31-40%
41-50%
51-60%
61-70%
71-80%
81-90%
91-100%

31 (9%)
32 (9%)
48 (14%)
66 (19%)
68 (20%)
60 (17%)
22 (6%)
10 (3%)
5 (1%)
1 (0%)

133 (20%)
104 (16%)
112 (17%)
100 (15%)
111 (17%)
63 (9%)
25 (4%)
12 (2%)
3 (0%)
1 (0%)

781(49%)
370 (23%)
186 (12%)
116 (7%)
77 (5%)
40 (2%)
13 (1%)
4 (0%)
8 (0%)
6 (0%)

Total

343 (100%)

664 (100%)

1601 (100%)

Similarly, Table 3 shows the distribution of the pay structures of the supervisory boards.
Again, it clearly shows that the zero-pay boards are mainly concentrated in the state-controlled
firms – 47% of the central SOEs and 30% of the local SOEs have a supervisory board whose
majority are zero-pay supervisors.
[Table 3] Structure of the Board of Supervisors, by Ownership Type
Central SOE
Boards

Local SOE
Boards

Non-SOE
Boards

Percentage of No-Pay Supervisors on the Board
0-10%
11-20%
21-30%
31-40%
41-50%
51-60%
61-70%
71-80%
81-90%
91-100%

57 (17%)
23 (7%)
5 (1%)
80 (23%)
16 (5%)
62 (18%)
88 (26%)
5 (1%)
0 (0%)
7 (2%)

167 (25%)
50 (8%)
14 (2%)
195 (29%)
32 (5%)
76 (11%)
113 (17%)
7 (1%)
2 (0%)
8 (1%)

1049 (66%)
37 (2%)
8 (0%)
286 (18%)
10 (1%)
23 (1%)
172 (11%)
4 (0%)
0 (0%)
12 (1%)

Total

343 (100%)

664 (100%)

1601 (100%)

38

In Table 2, 27%=17%+6%+3%+1%
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ii.

Causes and Implications

The large number of zero-pay directors and supervisors, as shown above, warrants an
exploration of underlying reasons and implications. Why are there so many no-pay directors and
supervisors? Is their compensation really zero as reported in the annual report?
The zero-pay phenomenon cannot be adequately explained without looking into the
network in which the listed firm is embedded. While ostensibly a large number of directors and
supervisors are unpaid by the listed companies they serve, they are actually paid by the
controlling shareholders or other corporate affiliates. As I have noted in previous work, the
typical approach to the study of Chinese corporate governance takes the listed firm as a standalone unit of analysis. 39 This approach certainly generates insights, but it ignores the important
fact that business groups are pervasive in China and the listed firm is just a subsidiary embedded
in a web of corporate entities, as earlier illustrated in Figure 2.
One feature of Chinese business groups is that there are frequent personnel interlocks
among member firms in a group. Top managers of a member firm such as a listed firm often
occupy top management positions of other member firms (often non-listed firms) in the same
group. Such personnel interlocks complicate executive compensation within the group. China’s
securities regulations require the listed company to explicitly state in its annual report whether or
not each of the top managers receives any compensation paid by its shareholders or other
affiliates.40 Table 4 summarizes the number and percentage of top managers who are not paid by
the listed company but instead paid by the listed firm’s shareholders or subsidiaries, according to
the data disclosed in the 2014 annual reports.

39
40

Lin and Milhaupt, supra note 18.
See Section I.B.
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[Table 4] Whether or Not Zero-Pay Managers Paid by Shareholders or Subsidiaries
Central
SOEs

Local
SOEs

Non-SOEs

Total

Zero-Pay CEOs
Paid by Shareholders or Subsidiaries
Not Paid by Shareholders or Subsidiaries
Total

7 (35%)
13 (65%)
20 (100%)

6 (26%)
17 (74%)
23 (100%)

4 (11%)
34 (89%)
38 (100%)

17(21%)
64(79%)
81(100%)

Zero-Pay Chairmen
Paid by Shareholders or Subsidiaries
Not Paid by Shareholders or Subsidiaries
Total

112 (50%)
110 (50%)
222 (100%)

157 (59%)
108 (41%)
265 (100%)

97 (50%)
96 (50%)
193 (100%)

366 (54%)
314 (46%)
680 (100%)

Zero-Pay Directors (excluding Chairmen)
Paid by Shareholders or Subsidiaries
Not Paid by Shareholders or Subsidiaries
Total

473 (42%)
648 (58%)
1121 (100%)

779 (47%)
871 (53%)
1650 (100%)

587 (30%)
1397 (70%)
1984 (100%)

1839 (39%)
2916 (61%)
4755 (100%)

Zero-Pay Supervisors
Paid by Shareholders or Subsidiaries
Not Paid by Shareholders or Subsidiaries
Total

309 (47%)
344 (53%)
653 (100%)

594 (57%)
456 (43%)
1050 (100%)

429 (45%)
518 (55%)
947 (100%)

1332 (50%)
1318 (50%)
2650 (100%)

Table 4 suggests that many of the zero-pay top managers are paid by the listed companies’
affiliates. It shows that 21% of the zero-pay CEOs, 54% of the zero-pay chairmen, 39% of the
zero-pay directors (excluding chairs) and 50% of the zero-pay supervisors are paid by the listed
company’s affiliates, instead of the listed company itself. Still, these numbers based on the
annual reports are significantly underestimated. The concept of “affiliates” is broadly defined in
China’s company law, yet in practice Chinese companies improperly narrow the scope of the
definition and thus underreport compensation by affiliates.41 The paying affiliates usually are

41

According to Section 217 of China’s Company Law, affiliate relationships include the company’s
relationships with the controlling shareholder, the actual controller, directors, supervisors or senior officers; or any
direct or indirect control relationship with the company; any other relations that may transfer the company’s
interests; state-controlled companies are not affiliates simply because of they are owned by the state. The
controlling shareholder is any shareholder who owns more than 50% of the company’s shares or any shareholder
who owns less than 50% but holds enough votes to influence the decisions of the shareholder meeting. The actual
controller is anyone who is not a shareholder but holds enough influence through equity or contractual relations with
the company to influence the company’s behavior. Despite this board legal definition, companies in practice limit
affiliates to the direct controlling shareholder (i.e. the parent company) when reporting whether executives are paid
by affiliates. Thus, if an executive is a senior manager of and paid by the parent’s controlling shareholder or
affiliates controlled by the same parent company, it would go unreported.
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controlling shareholders (i.e. parent companies). A typical example is as this: The chairman
(ZHOU Jiping) of PetroChina, a SOE listed on the Shanghai and the New York Stock Exchanges,
earned no compensation paid by the listed company itself but rather by the parent company
which is wholly-owned by SASAC. ZHOU simultaneously as the chairman of the parent
company was subject to SASAC’s pay decision. His compensation was decided behind closed
doors by SASAC, rather than by the governance institutions (i.e. the board of directors and
shareholder meetings) of the listed company. This pay arrangement is unobservable from the
annual report, unless one understands the corporate network and how SASAC wields its control
over executive compensation. But even if the listed company honestly discloses whether or not
each of its top managers earns compensation paid by its affiliates, the compensation remains a
myth to the public as the regulations do not require any disclosure of the amount paid by the
corporate affiliates.
The corporate group structure and the disclosure rules together nicely serve the interests
of the state-owner. Chinese SOE executive compensation, often riddled with corruption, is a
politically sensitive issue that the state-owner has been trying to keep it in secrecy. However, it is
becoming difficult to maintain secrecy for listed companies because of the increasing
transparency demand in the corporate governance world. It is fair to say that the zero-pay
phenomenon is a temporary balance between the state-owner’s (or the ruling elite’s) secrecy
interests and the demand of convergence on internationally-accepted disclosure rules. While the
Chinese regulators adopt the rule requiring disclosure of each top manager’s compensation paid
A prominent example is the chairman (CHANG, Xiabing) of China United Network Communications Ltd.
has been reported since 2004 in the annual reports that he earned no compensation paid by the listed firm or its
affiliates. However, CHANG was reported in the annual reports of China Unicom that he was paid by China
Unicom, an affiliate listed on the New York Stock Exchange. China United Network and China Unicom belong to
the same business group and owned by the same parent company; China United Network is an indirect controlling
shareholder of China Unicom. Moreover, there are overlaps in their top management personnel. This is just one
example. In my data collection process, I noticed that it is fairly common that companies fail to report compensation
by affiliates.
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by the listed company, they allow the listed company to hide compensation in its corporate
affiliates without violating the disclosure rule.
This information hiding strategy permitted by China’s domestic securities rules is not
effectively mitigated by cross-listing to international capital markets. Table 5 shows the number
and percentage of zero-pay managers of the 88 Chinese companies with shares listed both on
domestic and international stock exchanges. It shows that 8% of the CEOs, 41% of the chairmen,
31% of the directors (excluding chairmen) and 34% of the supervisors of the Chinese cross-listed
companies report zero in compensation paid by the listed firm they serve. As previously
discussed, these zero-pay managers are actually paid in a publicly-unknown amount by the listed
company’s affiliates. Most of these zero-pay companies are state-owned, including high-profile
firms such as PetroChina, Sinopec, Chalco and many others simultaneously listed on the
Shanghai and the New York Stock Exchanges. The Chinese state-owner’s interest in mystifying
executive compensation remains unharmed despite internationalization of the listed firms. The
limited role of international cross-listing in bringing transparency to executive compensation of
Chinese cross-listed firms partly relates to the regulatory fact that foreign issuers often enjoy lots
of disclosure exemptions and often compliance with the listed company’s domestic rules would
be deemed sufficient. The zero-pay phenomenon persistent in cross-listed Chinese companies
offers another piece of evidence to question whether cross-listing delivers any real positive
effects on Chinese firms.42

42

Donald Clarke, The Bonding Effect in Cross-Listed Chinese Companies: Is it Real?, GWU Law School
Public Law Research Paper No. 2015-55, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2710717.
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[Table 5] The Zero-Pay Situation among Firms with Shares Listed Overseas
Total Number of
Number of ZeroPercentage of
Managers
Pay Managers
Zero-Pay
(a)
(b)
Managers
(b)/(a)
CEOs
87
7
8%
Chairmen
85
35
41%
Directors (Excluding Chairmen)
863
270
31%
Supervisors
409
138
34%

A practical implication of the zero-pay phenomenon is that any measures of top
management compensation of Chinese listed companies should be taken with great caution. For
example, as shown in Table 6 below, the average compensation varies significantly with the
inclusion or exclusion of the zero-pay managers. Unfortunately, existing literature on Chinese
executive compensation does not make it clear whether the sample includes or excludes zero-pay
managers.43
[Table 6] Average Pay Differences if Zero-Pay Managers Included or Excluded
Including
Zero-Pay
[a]
545,249
(2,596)

Excluding
Zero-Pay
[b]
739, 635
(1,914)

Difference
(RMB)
[b-a]
194,386

Difference (%)
[(b-a)/a]

Directors (Excluding Chair)

217,179
(20,061)

285,286
(15,272)

68,107

31.4%

Supervisors

185,681
(9,499)

258,100
(6,834)

72,419

39%

Chairmen

35.7%

Note: Number of managers in brackets.
Fundamentally, the zero-pay phenomenon raises doubt over top managers’ ability to act
in the best interest of the listed company. The standard approach to the study of executive
compensation views pay as a solution to the agency problem. Compensation schemes are to
provide directors and officers with efficient incentives to loyally pursue the interests of the
43

None of the studies reviewed in Appendix articulates whether it includes or excludes the zero-pay
executives in data analysis.
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company that they serve. But the loyalty to the listed company may be in jeopardy when
directors and officers are not compensated by the listed company itself but by its controlling
shareholder; what’s worse is that the amount of compensation is a black box to the public. This
hidden pay arrangement may exacerbate the central governance problem in concentrated
ownership structure – controlling shareholders exploit minority shareholders. As I recently noted
in a co-authored work on China’s state capitalism, the state-owner “seeks to maximize a range of
benefits extending from state revenues to technology prowess and from soft power aboard to
regime survival at home.”44 In the eye of the state-owner, the individual listed firm’s financial
interests are subordinate to the country’s interests as defined by the ruling elite. Pay by the
controlling shareholder rather than the listed firm itself reinforces this interest preference.
Finally, the zero-pay phenomenon calls for rethinking the meaning of executive
compensation in the Chinese context. The compensation disclosed in the annual report is the
amount legally approved by the board of directors and/or the shareholder meeting. It is a
legitimate financial incentive given to executives. However, are Chinese SOE managers really
motivated by the legitimate pay or more by something else?45 China’s SOE system is full of rent
seeking opportunities for top managers. Financial gains are not necessarily in the form of legal
compensation but illegal payments such as briberies.46 Political career advancements may be

44

Lin and Milhaupt, supra note 18 at 746.
This question is vividly illustrated by the recent comment by the former chairman (WANG, Jianzhou) of
China Mobile, a SOE listed on the Hong Kong and New York Stock Exchanges. In the Summer Annual Meeting
(known as Summer Davos) of the World Economic Forum, held in September 2015, WANG as the chairman of the
Association of China’s Listed Companies commented on executive pay cuts and stated that “To be honest, top
managers of large SOEs and large enterprises consider a lot of things everyday as they manage tens of thousands of
employees and they do not really care about the level of personal executive pay.”
http://economy.caijing.com.cn/20150909/3964095.shtml.
46
It was reported that SOE executives accounted for 76% of the 605 cases of entrepreneurs as criminals for
the year of 2015 alone. The top three crimes for SOE executives were bribery (278 cases), corruption (66) and
embezzlement (21). The cases have been increasing over the past years. See The 2015 Criminal Report of China’s
Entrepreneurs, available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/201604/05/content_6551886.htm?node=5955. The report is an annual publication starting in 2009 by Legal Daly, Legal
Weekly, and China Youth Daily to track criminal records of Chinese entrepreneurs.
45
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another form of incentives.47 If they are motivated by executive compensation, companies should
fill in the blank spaces of compensation tables in the annual report. But if they are actually not
motivated by executive compensation, then the disclosed pay in the annual report, regardless of
the amount, does not matter much and it leaves a black hole of what to be disclosed to investors.

C. Nominal versus Actual Pay
Reporting zero in executive pay is rather intuitively suspicious and should be subject to
close scrutiny. Still, ostensibly reasonable compensation figures disclosed in the corporate
annual report can be misleading, particularly for Chinese SOEs. The pay disclosed in the annual
report sometimes may be a nominal rather than actual amount paid to SOE managers; and the
gap between the nominal pay and the actual pay can be very large.
The nominal versus actual pay practice traces back to the overseas listing wave among
Chinese SOEs in the 1990s. It was created as an expedient solution to the disparity between the
pay level allowed in China’s state-owned sector and the pay level demanded in the international
capital market. On the one hand, executive compensation of Chinese SOEs traditionally was
shockingly low by international standards. The low pay could raise a red flag on Chinese firms’
governance quality and could negatively affect their initial public offering (IPO) price and
subsequent corporate value in the international capital market. On the other hand, international
pay practices, especially stock options that often drive compensation high, were incompatible
with the traditional pay system of Chinese SOEs, whose top managers were often government
officials and their pay was benchmarked against civil service pay. In the face of the institutional

47

Jerry Cao et al., Political Promotion, CEO Compensation and Their Effect on Firm Performance, AFA
2011 Denver Meetings Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1512142 (showing that “both
monetary and political incentives are positively related to firm performance” and moreover “the monetary
compensation-based incentive is weaker when CEO incentives are heavily driven by political career concerns”).
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clashes, Chinese SOEs contrived the appearance of adopting Western-style compensation
schemes to alleviate the market concerns while at the same time clandestinely making informal
arrangements with their top managers to maintain the state’s control over compensation. A
recent study suggests that stock options granted to executives of Chinese SOEs listed on the
Hong Kong Stock Exchange, many of which are also on the New York Stock Exchange, are
merely window dressing to satisfy the taste of foreign investors.48 Executives of Chinese listed
SOEs are never allowed to freely exercise stock options shown in corporate annual reports; and
even if exercised, they are expected or required to surrender the gain to the parent company. 49
The nominal versus actual pay practice is further institutionalized by SASAC’s
compensation management beyond its legal authority. SASAC is legally authorized to manage
executive compensation of the company under its direct ownership (i.e., the parent company
rather than the listed subsidiary in Figure 2). In reality, SASAC’s compensation management
power effectively reaches down to the listed subsidiary. Top managers of the listed subsidiary
who are also executives of the parent company are in fact subject to SASAC’s pay decisions,
which effectively override the pay approved by the board of the listed company. Available
information indicates that the actual compensation approved by SASAC and paid to the
executives can be very different from (usually considerably less than) the nominal pay disclosed
in the annual report.50 This important fact that many SOEs do not receive the pay disclosed in

48

Zhihong Chen et al., Are Stock Option Grants to Directors of State-Controlled Chinese Firms Listed in
Hong Kong Genuine Compensation?, 88 ACCOUNTING REV. 1547 (2013).
49
Id.
50
The actual and nominal pay disparity sometimes may be observed in an inconspicuous footnote of an
annual report. For example, Poly Real Estate (a listed central SOE) disclosed in a footnote of its 2012 annual report
that “according to the compensation system approved by the board of directors, the chairman (SONG, Guangju)’s
total compensation for the fiscal year of 2012 should be 2.8 million; however, according to SASAC’s decision, the
pre-tax actual pay is 605 thousand dollars.” The company’s 2013, 2014, and 2015 annual reports stated in a footnote
that “the chairman’s compensation was unavailable for disclosure because SASAC had not yet completed the annual
performance review for the chairman.”
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the annual report but rather a pay internally determined by SASAC is sometimes downplayed as
a footnote in the annual report or buried in obscure corporate documents, and more often it is
entirely unstated.
How SASAC determines SOE executive compensation is opaque, though it has published
some rules regarding its compensation policy. According to the published rules, the basic
structure of managerial compensation includes three parts: base salaries, performance bonuses,
and mid-/long-term incentive compensation. Briefly speaking, the base salary is a function of the
size of the enterprise, the difficulty level of managing the enterprise, the responsibilities
undertaken, and the average worker’s pay of the given enterprise, the given industry and the
given city where the enterprise is located.51 Managers receive base salaries monthly. The
structure and payment of performance bonuses are based on much more complicated formula in

For central SOEs, CNOOC Ltd, one of the largest state-owned oil companies in China and listed on the
Hong Kong and New York Stock Exchanges, is the most representative case. CNOOC’s annual reports disclosed
that several of its top managers were paid multi million dollars (RMB) annually, which aroused public anger in 2009.
In response, CNOOC clarified that since the first day of the listings in 2001, all the top managers had agreed to
donate the pay approved by the board of directors to the parent company and they actually received the amount
determined by SASAC rather than the amount published to the public. According to CNOOC, the difference
between the actual pay and the nominal pay was like “the sky and the earth.” See CNOOC Reply to Ten Million
Annual Pay: Actual and Nominal Pay like Sky and the Earth, XINHUA NEWS, April 14, 2009 (reporting the public
explanation made by CNOOC’s spokesman) at http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/200904/13/content_11180853.htm; CNOOC’s statements were consistent with information given by SASAC’s officials
in interviews. See SASAC Experts: Annual Executive Pay at Central SOEs often 400 Thousand Dollars, No One
Over One Million, CHINA ECONOMIC WEEKLY, Volume 37, Sep. 21 2009.
For local SOEs, Huayuan Property is the case widely reported in news media. Since 2008, the company had
disclosed in its annual reports that its chairmen (REN, Jiqiang) earned more than $7 million RMB. In the face of the
public outcry over the excessive compensation, the company released a formal statement in 2010 explaining Ren’s
compensation composition and it flagged the fact that Ren’s compensation was determined by SASAC and for the
fiscal year of 2009, the amount approved by SASAC was less than 700 thousand, only one tenth of the disclosed
amount in the annual report. See Huanyan Property’s Announcement on Feb. 4, 2010, available for downloads from
the website of the Shanghai Stock Exchange http://www.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/.
51
SASAC published the formula explaining how to calculate managerial compensation, see Zhongyang
Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Guanli Zanxing Banfa Shixing Xize [Implementation Detailed Rules for Provisional
Measures on Compensation Administration of Top Managers of the Central State-Owned Enterprises], promulgated
in 2004. For the CEO or chairman of the enterprise, the function of base salary is: W= W0*L*R. W indicates the
base salary. W0 indicates 5 times of the average worker’s pay in state-owned enterprises nationwide in the past year.
L indicates a combination index including the assets size, industry, profits, etc. R indicates a value between 1 and
1.4 determined by SASAC.
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which political loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party is a factor.52 The performance bonus is
contingent on the annual performance evaluation and the three-year term review.53 However,
how the SOE executives are actually evaluated and paid under these formal rules remains unclear.

IV.

Implications and Questions for Future Research
A. Implications for Comparative Corporate Governance Scholarship
The central theme of comparative corporate governance scholarship seeks to explain the

variance of governance systems around the world. Among various factors, politics has been
recognized as a key explanation for different national governance regimes.54 Nevertheless, the
mainstream approach to executive compensation pays limited attention to politics. Most recent
studies of executive compensation have relied on optimal contracting theory or managerial
power theory, both of which are developed with a focus on the U.S. experience.55 Optimal
contracting theory assumes that boards are able to bargain with managers and get optimal
contracts for shareholders’ interests. Managerial power theory, however, argues that the level
and structure of executive compensation are not shaped by efficient contracting but rather
distorted by renting seeking managers who are able to capture board members to set their own
compensation. However, as leading executive pay scholar Kevin Murphy critically commented
on the U.S. executive pay literature,
52

See Zhongyang Qiye Lingdao Banzi he Lingdao Renyuan Zonghe Kaohe Pingjia Banfa [Measures on the
Comprehensive Performance Evaluation of Top Management Teams and Top Managers of the Central State-Owned
Enterprises],Dec. 30, 2009; Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Jingying Yeji Kaohe Zanxing Banfa [Provisional Measures
on Performance Evaluation of Top Managers of the Central State-Owned Enterprises], SASAC No. [30],
promulgated on Dec. 29, 2012.
53
Id.
54
Mark Roe has been a leading advocate for the importance of politics in shaping corporate governance
systems. See Mark Roe, THE POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL
CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
55
Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE
OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2006). Bebchuk and Fried criticize optimal contracting theory and offer an
alternative view, managerial power theory.
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Most recent analyses of executive compensation have focused on efficient-contracting or
managerial-power rationales for pay, while ignoring or downplaying the causes and
consequences of disclosure requirements, tax policies, accounting rules, legislation, and
the general political climate. A central theme of this study is that government intervention
has been both a response to and a major driver of time trends in executive compensation
over the past century, and that any explanation for pay that ignores political factors is
critically incomplete.56
This observation actually is even truer in the Chinese context. Scholars of Chinese executive
compensation, like their U.S. counterparts, follow the two prevailing theories. But meanwhile
they are certainly aware of the important role of government intervention given that the most
important enterprises in China are state-owned. More often than not, the scholars treat
government intervention equivalent to binary variables of state ownership (i.e., whether or not
the firm is owned by the state) or top managers’ political connections (i.e., whether or not the
firm’s top managers are former or incumbent government officers). This Article adds a new
dimension of government influence through the lens of disclosure rules. China’s disclosure
regulations give controlling shareholders great latitude in maneuvering executive compensation
reporting and ultimately mask the true numbers of executive pay of publicly listed companies.
The ruling elite’s interest in limiting public scrutiny over its SOE personnel management
remains largely unharmed despite ostensibly mandatory disclosure of each individual executive’s
compensation under the securities regulations. The disclosure regime well serves the interests of
the state-owner (or the ruling elite).

56

Kevin Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We are, and How We Got There, HANDBOOK OF
THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE Volume 2, Part A, Chapter 4, Pages 211-356 (2013) Edited by George M.
Constantinides, Milton Harris and Rene M. Stulz.
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Another issue relates to comparative corporate governance scholarship is the perennial
debate about the future trajectory of national corporate governance systems in the era of
globalization. Will they converge on a universal model or will they continue to retain their
national characteristics? For executive compensation, its convergence question essentially asks
whether there is “Americanization” of executive pay – the prevalent use of performance-oriented
pay and lucrative compensation.57 On its face, China seems to present “formal convergence”58 in
the sense that China’s recent regulations explicitly advocate for performance-oriented pay (such
as cash bonuses and stock options), a key feature of the U.S. pay paradigm. Moreover, empirical
evidence based on the formal numbers disclosed in the annual reports of China’s listed
companies show that while executives earn only a fraction of compensation paid to American
executives, their compensation has been rising very swiftly.59 While the recent formal rules and
formal pay figures show some changes toward to the U.S. standards, the informal practices
(including on-duty consumption, the zero-pay practice, and the nominal-actual pay divide) place
a cautionary note on the substantive meaning of the converging formal rules and formal pay
figures.
Related to the convergence debate, the informal pay practices offer an illustration of pay
reform and “institutional complementarity”60, a concept used by scholars of comparative
corporate governance to describe that institutions are resistant to change due to institutional
57

Brian Cheffins and Randall S. Thomas, The Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive Pay, 1
BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 233 (2004).
58
Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J.
COMP. L. 329 (defining “formal convergence” as convergence of rules on the books).
59
Alex Bryson et al., Same or Different? The CEO Labour Market in China's Public Listed Companies,
124 THE ECON. J. 90-108 (2014) (finding that the average total cash and bonus compensation for a top executive in
2010 was equivalent to US$129,399; and the pay has doubled between 2005 and 2010).
60
The leading scholarship of using “institutional complementarities” to compare political economies is
Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM:
THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1-70 (Peter A. Hall and David
Soskice eds. 2001). Their idea is that any political economy is composed of several institutions such as corporate
governance, labor markets, and more. The institutions become functionally complement over time; as a result, the
institutions are stable and difficult to change.
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interdependence. As previously discussed in Section III, the informal pay practices are
important institutions complementary to the government’s peculiar personnel management in
which there are frequent rotations between the government bureaus and SOEs. The personnel
linkages across the government and the SOE sector facilitate the formation and implementation
of national economic policy and promote coalition among the ruling elite. Because SOE
executive pay is inextricably tied to personnel appointments, any significant change to the pay
institution requires a functional adjustment of its interconnected appointment institution. The
government’s recent SOE reform policy, as discussed below in detail, suggests that the
complementarity of executive pay and personnel appointment institutions makes pay reform
more challenging.

B. Implications for Reform Policy
In recent years, executive compensation has become high on the Chinese SOE reform
agenda. The Chinese government has promulgated many rules to curb excessive executive pay at
SOEs. In the wake of the global financial crisis, China’s Ministry of Finance imposed a policy
where the maximum pre-tax pay at state-controlled financial institutions would be 2.8 million
RMB.61 More recently, amid of the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, the government declared
that the base salary for central SOE executives is equal to twice of the average worker’s pay;
annual performance bonus should be no more than twice of the base salary; and on-duty
consumption should be constrained.62 Local SOEs are subject to similar policies as well.63
61

Ministry of Finance, Jinrong lei Guoyou ji Guoyou Konggu Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Guanli Banfa
[Administrative Measures on Top Managerial Compensation of State-Owned and State-Controlled Financial
Enterprises], Jan. 13, 2009, a summary of the measures available at
http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengwengao/2009niancaizhengbuwengao/caizhengwengao2009dierqi/20
0904/t20090413_132166.html; for inside information about the rules, see
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/1040/8771812.html.
62
Supra note 23.
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Overall, the pay reform to date has been focused on the substantive components of compensation
rather than the decision-making process and transparency.64 Indeed, transparency is particularly
challenging in China’s political environment. Disclosure of SOE executive pay may intensify the
public’s outrage against economic inequality and political corruption. It touches a nerve with
China’s ruling elite who are dreadful of any threat to social and political stability. Furthermore,
as shown in this Article, even though mandatory disclosure rules of executive compensation are
in place, it does not necessarily lead to transparency when misrepresentation is actually
orchestrated by the government out of its own political interests, and gatekeepers including
lawyers and auditors give way to this political reality. The transparency reform of executive
compensation in China requires not just releasing numbers to the public but information
credibility verification and truthful disclosure culture.65 Otherwise, the disclosed numbers would
be just whatever the company (or the state-owner) wants them to appear to the public.
In the late December 2016, SASAC for the first time disclosed executive compensation
of the 111 SOEs under its control.66 As noted, many zero-pay managers of the listed companies
are actually paid by the parent companies under SASAC’s control. This disclosure initiative fills
some information gaps in the zero-pay puzzle. According to the released data, the highest pre-tax
pay in 2015 was $1.2 million RMB and the executive pay was often between $500,000 and

63

Id.
Tellingly, even the reform rules themselves have no transparency. The government has never published
the text of the rules but only publicly disclosed a brief summary of the reform policies. While rumors in news
suggest that the government will soon disclose SOE executive compensation in detail, no progress in this regard has
been detected.
65
SASAC officials sometimes informally in news interviews disclosed fragmented information about SOE
executive compensation. However, this informal way of disclosure has no comparability and reliability.
66
SASAC, Guowuyuan Guoziwei Guanli Qiye Fuzeren 2015 Niandu Xinchou inxi Pilu (国务院国资委管
理企业负责人 2015 年度薪酬信息披露),
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n85463/n327265/n327406/n327425/c2513588/content.html.
64
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$800,000 RMB. 67 Although this recent disclosure initiative is an encouraging move towards
transparency, such disclosure suffers a significant time lag and faces credibility challenges.68
It is fair to say that all the “behind the numbers” problems are essentially rooted in
China’s peculiar personnel management. The Chinese Communist Party as the visible hand
governs the SOE executive labor market. Top managers of important SOEs, like government
officials, are evaluated and appointed by the Party. In this personnel system, SOE (formal)
executive pay is benchmarked against civil servant pay and significantly lower than the market
rates for corporate executives. As a result, SOE executives have incentives to lavishly use onduty consumption as a way to compensate for the sense of unfairness. The state-owner
(ultimately the Party) has interests to maintain its personnel control and secrecy by practicing the
zero-pay reporting and the nominal-actual pay gap. The Party’s retreat from SOE personnel
management is the key to successful compensation reform of Chinese SOEs. Unfortunately, until
today the Party remains unwilling to relinquish this power. While in recent years the government
has experimented with the idea of recruiting top managers from outside the state sector, my
recent empirical research shows that the executive labor market of China’s SOEs remains
virtually closed to those who are outside the state system.69 Part of the reason for the absence of
professionals recruited outside the state system is that the pay is too low compared to the
prevailing market rate. To handle this problem, the Chinese government is experimenting with a
dual pay system for SOEs. Under the system, the compensation of executives whose careers
develop within the state system is unilaterally set by SASAC’s evaluation, while those recruited
from outside are paid based on market rates through contract negotiation. The latter
67

Id. The chairman and CEO of the China Merchants Group received the highest pay.
SASAC disclosed the 2015 pay at the end of 2016. Its disclosure time is no contemporaneous with
annual reporting of listed companies. Moreover, the low executive pay reinforces the common belief that Chinese
SOE executives do not reply on formal pay but other sources of income (“gray income”).
69
Lin, supra note 32.
68
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compensation is usually much higher than the former. It is unclear whether such dualism will
work well because anecdotal evidence indicates that it can brew resentment among those whose
pay is subject to SASAC’s relatively low pay policy.70

C. Questions for Future Research
The primary research methodology of executive compensation literature is quantitative
analysis of compensation data disclosed in formal corporate reports. The validity of this research
approach is built on the premise that the numbers published on paper fairly reflect the
compensation practices in effect. This premise is apt when corporate governance institutions are
competent and efficient. However, it should be taken with great caution in China’s context where
the capital market remains relatively immature. Also as scholars of Chinese law commonly note,
the gap between the law on the books and the law in action is often considerably large in China.
To be sure, it is unwarranted to entirely deny the credibility of information disclosed in the
annual reports of China’s listed companies, yet it does reasonably suggest the limitation of
statistically crunching numbers to understand the true practices of Chinese corporate governance
including executive compensation. Future empirical research should conduct surveys and
interviews to get deeper insights in order to fully understand the operation of executive
compensation in the Chinese context.
The findings in this Article suggest another lacuna of existing empirical research on
Chinese executive compensation: business groups as a missing variable. A Chinese listed firm is
often part of a business group and some studies have investigated how the business group

70

See Beijing News, Forty Percent of the Central SOE Executives Recruited Worldwide are from Inside the
System, May 2011 (interviewing a SOE CEO who was offered to pay at market rate but declined the offer and
accepted the lower pay policy because of the potential resentment concern).
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structure may influence a Chinese firm’s financial performance and accounting behavior.71 Yet
most existing studies of Chinese executive compensation lack the variable of business group and
tend to treat the listed firm as a stand-alone unit. How the business group structure may influence
Chinese executive compensation is an important topic to be explored. A very recent study found
that executive compensation of a Chinese listed subsidiary is correlated with the performance
and compensation of another listed subsidiary in the same business group.72
Furthermore, the zero-pay phenomenon raises some specific questions to be investigated
in the future. For instance, does the lack of financial compensation really impair managers’
capability to satisfy their fiduciary duties? Empirically, do companies with a higher percentage
of zero-pay directors or supervisors on the board demonstrate inferior financial performance,
more frequent related-party transactions, more sanctions by securities regulators, or any other
undesirable behavior? Positive answers lend some support to the concerns about fiduciary duties
while negative answers lead to further inquiries about any other mechanisms that may effectively
align board members’ interests with the listed company even when they are not paid by the
company at all.

Conclusion
In recent years, Chinese executive compensation has received considerable media and
scholarly attention. News media have annually broadcasted answers to the questions like who are

71

See e.g., Jia He et al., Business Groups in China, 22 J. CORP. FIN. 166 (2013); Lisa A. Keister,
Engineering Growth: Business Group Structure and Firm Performance in China’s Transition Economy, 104 AM. J.
SOC. 404 (1998); Lisa A. Keister, Interfirm Relations in China: Group Structure and Firm Performance in Business
Groups, 52 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1709 (2009).
72
Guilong Cai and Guojian Zheng, Executive Compensation in Business Groups: Evidence From China, 9
CHINA J. ACCOUNT. RES. 25 (2016) (specifically finding that “when the change in performance of one
subsidiary is lower than that of the other subsidiaries, the change in its executive compensation is significantly lower.
Further, when the business group is private and the level of marketization is high, the subsidiary’s executive
compensation is more likely to be influenced by the performance of the other subsidiaries”).
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the highest paid CEOs; scholarship has heatedly debated whether there is an excessive pay
problem; and the government has taken high-profile measures to slash SOE executive
compensation. Yet, a more than two-decade-old comment on American executive compensation
in the Harvard Business Review seems apt for the current situation in China – “The relentless
focus on how much CEOs are paid diverts public attention from the real problem—how CEOs
are paid.”73 The “how” indeed has Chinese characteristics, rather than merely an issue of
compensation composition like in the United States and elsewhere. Understanding how Chinese
executives are paid is a challenging task because it is not a matter simply by crunching the
numbers released in public companies’ annual reports. A valid reading of formal compensation
figures entails an understanding of the network structure and the political environment in which
Chinese companies operate.

73

Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, THE
MAY–JUNE 1990 ISSUE, https://hbr.org/1990/05/ceo-incentives-its-not-how-much-you-pay-but-how.
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Appendix
Authors

Data
Years
1980s

Sample

Compensation Data

Survey data on about 400
non-listed Chinese SOEs

Annual CEO salary and bonuses

Chong-En Bai and Lixin Colin Xu. 2005. Incentives for CEOs with Multitasks: Evidence
from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises, Journal of Comparative Economics 33(3):517539.

Late
1980s

Survey data on more than
300 non-listed Chinese
SOEs

Annual CEO salary and bonuses

Takao Kato and Cheryl Long. 2006. Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and
Corporate Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai Shenzhen
Stock Exchanges, Economic Development and Cultural Change. 54(4):945-983.

19982002

937 listed companies

Average of the three highest-paid senior
managers’ cash compensation

Michael Firth, Tak Yan Leung, Oliver M. Rui. 2006. Corporate Performance and CEO
Compensation in China, Journal of Corporate Finance 12(4):693-714.

19982000

549 non-financial listed
companies

Assuming the highest-paid executive’s
pay as CEO pay

Michael Firth, Tak Yan Leung, Oliver M. Rui. 2007. How Ownership and Corporate
Governance Influence Chief Executive Pay in China’s Listed Firms, Journal of Business
Research 60: 776-785.

19982000

549 non-financial listed
companies

Assuming the highest-paid executive’s
pay as CEO pay

Trevor Buck, Xiaohiu Liu and Rodion Skovoroda. 2008. Top Executive Pay and Firm
Performance in China, Journal of International Business Studies 39, 833-850.

20002003

601 listed companies in
2000

Average of the three highest-paid senior
managers’ cash compensation

Ruilong Yang and Jidong Yang. 2009. Why Has Top Executive Compensation Increased
So Much In China: An Explanation of Peer-Effects. Pacific Economic Review. 14(5): 705716.

20012007

994 listed firms

Sum of the three highest-paid senior
managers’ cash compensation (change in
the sum between years)

Michael Firth, Tak Yan Leung, Oliver M. Rui. 2010. Justifying Top Management Pay in A
Transitional Economy. Journal of Empirical Finance 15(7)852-866.

20002005

Non-financial listed
companies

Average of the three highest-paid
executive directors’ cash compensation

Shujun Ding et al. 2010. Executive Compensation, Supervisory Board, and China’s
Governance Reform: A Legal Approach Perspective. Review of Quantitative Financial
Accounting 35:445-471.

20052006

Listed firms (1,345
observations in 2005 and
1,410 in 2006)

Average and sum of the three highestpaid executive directors’ cash
compensation

Jean Chen et al. 2010. The Effect of Insider Control and Global Benchmarks on Chinese
Executive Compensation. Corporate Governance: An International Review 18(2):107-123.

20012006

502 listed companies

Sum of the three highest-paid senior
managers’ cash compensation

Marin J. Conyon and Lerong He. 2011. Executive Compensation and Corporate
Governance in China, Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(4):1158-1175.

20012005

Almost all listed firms
(in both Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock
Exchanges)

Sum of the three highest-paid senior
managers’ cash compensation

Mengistae and Xu .2004. Agency Theory and Executive Compensation of Chinese StateOwned Enterprises, Journal of Labor Economics 22:615-637.
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Tajao Kato and Cheryl Long. 2011. Tournaments and Managerial Incentives In China's
Listed Firms: New Evidence, China Economic Review 22(1):1-10.

19982002

Tier 1 executives: average of the three
highest-paid senior managers’ cash
compensation
Tier 2 executives: average of all other
executives including all directors,
supervisors, and high-level executives.

Pattarin Adithipyangkul et al.. 2011. Executive Perks: Compensation and Corporate
Performance in China. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 28:402-425.

19992004

3,706 year-firm
observations

Assuming disclosed expenses on eating,
traveling, company cars, communication,
socializing, and entertaining spent for
management’s personal consumption

Wei Luo et al. 2011. Bank Ownership and Executive Perquisites: New Evidence from an
Emerging Market. Journal of Corporate Finance 17(2):352-370.

19962006

All listed firms
(excluding financial
industries)

Perk 1: Regress Mexpense (i.e. Total
administrative expenses minus bad debt
expenses, unrealized holding gain or loss
for inventory if any, and direct
compensation for directors and top
executives) on several firm
characteristics, and use the residual
values as the abnormal administrative
expenses of a company
Perk 2: Sum of disclosed travel, eat,
drink, entertainment and vehicle
expenses, medical allowances and
medical expenses, pension expenses,
housing allowance, moving and
relocation expenses, educational
expenses; office expenses, board meeting
fees, communication expenses,
conference fees, and insurance expenses.

Hongbin Cai et al. 2011. Eat, Drink, Firms, Government: An Investigation of Corruption
from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms. Journal of Law and Economics
54(1): 55-78.
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Kun Wang and Xing Xiao. 2011 Controlling Shareholders’ Tunneling and Executive
Compensation: Evidence from China, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. 30(1):89100.

19992005

Jerry Cao et al. 2011. Political Promotion, CEO Incentives, and the Relationship Between
Pay and Performance. Wharton Financial Institute Working Paper #11-53.

20052009

Dongwei Su. 2011. State Ownership, Corporate Tournament and Executive Compensation:
Evidence from Public Listed Firms in China. Singapore Economic Review. 56(3): 307-332.

19992006

6670 firm-year
observations with
executive compensation
and 5150 firm-year
observations with
changes in executive
compensation.
756 listed firms

Sum of the three highest-paid senior
managers’ cash compensation

1,386 listed firms

Cash pay gap between different tiers of
managers

Sum of the three highest-paid senior
managers’ cash compensation

Tier 1: CEO, President and the Chair of
the Board of Directors
Tier 2: Vice Chief Manager, Vice
President, Vice Board Chair and the
Chair of the Supervisory Committee
Tier 3: Executive Board Director and
members of the Supervisory Committee
and other senior officers
Ningyue Liu et al. 2012. Government Intervention And Executive Compensation Contracts
of State-Owned Enterprises: Empirical Evidence From China. Journal of Chinese
Economic and Business Studies 10(4):391-411.

19992008

8269 firm-year
observations

Average of the three highest-paid
directors’ cash compensation

Bin Ke, Oliver Rui, Wei Yu. 2012. Hong Kong Stock Listing and the Sensitivity of
Managerial Compensation to Firm Performance in State-Controlled Chinese Firms, Review
of Accountings Studies 17:166-188.

20032004

266 A shares, 124 H
shares, 71 Red Chip
shares

Average of the three highest-paid senior
managers’ cash compensation

Marin J. Conyon and Lerong He. 2012. CEO Compensation and Corporate Governance in
China, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(6):575-592.

20052010

Almost all listed firms

CEO pay: Individual CEO’s cash sum
(salary, bonus, stipends. excluding
equity)
CEO equity: Individual CEO’s
shareholding and equity grants

Yongli Luo and Dave O. Jackson. 2012. Executive Compensation, Ownership Structure
and Firm Performance in Chinese Financial Corporations, Global Business and Finance
Review 2012: 56-74.

43

20012009

142 financial firms

Average of the three highest-paid
executive directors’ cash compensation

Behind the Numbers
L.Lin
Alex Bryson et al. 2013. Same or Different? The CEO Labour Market in China's Public
Listed Companies. The Economic Journal. 124 (574):90-108

20012010

2197 listed firms

Average of the three highest-paid
executives’ cash compensation

Hao Liang, Luc Rennebooga, Sunny Li Sun. 2015. The Political Determinants of Executive
Compensation: Evidence from an Emerging Economy. Emerging Markets Review, 25, 6991.

20012011

More than 92% of all the
listed firms

Sum of the three highest-paid senior
managers’ cash compensation

Lars Helge Hab et al. 2015. Equity Incentives and Corporate Fraud in China. Journal of
Business Ethics. 1-20.

20002010

Listed firms

Shareholding the measure of equity
incentives: (1) supervisors’ shares (the
number of shares held by the board of
supervisors); (2) management’s shares
(the number of shares held by directors
and senior managers)

Zhigang Zheng et al. 2016. Executive Compensation and Legal Investor Protection:
Evidence from China's Listed Firms. Review of Development Economics 20(1):39-47

20022008

Listed firms

Industry-mean adjusted average of the
three highest-paid senior managers’ cash
compensation

Guilong Cai and Guojian Zheng. 2015. Executive Compensation in Business Groups:
Evidence From China. China. Journal of Accounting Research 9(1): 25-39
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271 listed business
groups

Sum of the three highest-paid senior
managers’ cash compensation
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